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BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the United States Supreme Court's ever-
tightening scrutiny of any regulation of accurate commercial
speech, it might seem that the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech is without a difference.' But there
remains a considerable difference when the audience is being
deceived. In contrast to deceptive noncommercial speech, there
are neither constitutional nor public policy reasons to protect
deceptive' commercial speech.'
Despite this distinction, the Court has never succeeded
in articulating a workable definition of commercial speech. As a
result, lower courts have frequently struggled to determine
when corporate speech receives less than full protection under
the First Amendment. The California Supreme Court in Kasky
v. Nike4 (Kasky) sought to resolve some of this uncertainty by
fashioning a "limited purpose" test. The issue in Kasky was
whether Nike's statements about its labor practices in overseas
factories, communicated in letters to university athletic
directors, were commercial speech and therefore susceptible to
false advertising laws.' The court held that commercial speech
includes a corporation's communications to customers or
potential customers about its business operations, including
the working conditions, wages, identities and qualifications of
those making the products, though only for the limited purpose
See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial
Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 88 (1999) ("[T]he notion that classifying speech as
commercial regulates it to a First Amendment backwater has become increasingly
antiquated."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 126 ("[1It is unclear why
'commercial speech' should continue to be treated as a separate category of
speech....").
' Author's use of the modifier "deceptive" throughout this Note is in the
sense of commercial deception; that is, false or materially misleading.
3 See infra Part II.B. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, The Regulation of
Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services: A Multifactor
Approach, 52 U. PIt. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) ("[Tlhe concerns that warrant a privilege of
sorts to disseminate falsehoods outside the commercial sphere do not apply with equal
force to speech within the commercial sphere.").
4 45 P.3d 243 (2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654.
6 The letters were not the only communications alleged in Kasky's complaint
to be misleading commercial speech. For the complete list of communications named,
and an explanation of why this Note focuses only on the letters to universities, see
infra note 60.
6 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
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of ensuring that these communications are not false or
deceptive.7
This Note argues that the Kasky court was correct to
recognize that today's commercial speech encompasses
communications beyond traditional advertisements about
products or services. Corporations are aware that a sizeable
number of consumers rely on their statements about their
business operations when making investment and purchasing
decisions. In order to ensure the accuracy of these statements,
and thereby protect the integrity of the market, this speech is
properly considered commercial speech.
Speech about business operations also possesses the
"common sense" safeguards that distinguish commercial speech
from noncommercial speech. Like speech about products or
services, factual statements about business operations are
likely to be within the commercial speaker's knowledge.' And
as we will see, there is a substantial economic incentive for
corporations to continue to speak about their business
operations, even after the ruling in Kasky."
While the case was pending before the United States
Supreme Court, a politically diverse range of organizations
emerged on Nike's side, including the ACLU, the AFL-CIO, and
the Business Roundtable." More interesting, however, was the
substantial disagreement within at least one of these groups
about the merits of the Kasky test. When the United States
Supreme Court agreed to review the decision, the Northern
California ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting Nike,1
while the Southern California ACLU's Catherine Fisk co-
authored an amicus brief for Kasky with Erwin Chemerinsky.1"
See id. at 247, 257. The United States Supreme Court initially granted
certiorari to review this decision and in fact heard oral arguments, but it declined to
rule on the case on the last day of term and the parties ultimately settled before trial.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part W.A.
9 See infra Part IV.B.1.
1o See infra Part IV.B.2.
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Free Speech for Companies on Justices'
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at A17.
1 See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
ACLU of Northern California in Support of Petitioner, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (No. 02-575).
13 See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress,
Representatives Dennis Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine Brown, and Bob Filner,
Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). Moreover, the ACLU of Southern




These peculiar alignments and factions starkly illustrate the
difficult issues inherent in the commercial speech doctrine.
Kasky's critics generally concede that statements about
business operations properly may be considered commercial
speech, but argue that Nike should be protected from liability
for deception because the corporation was engaged in debate on
a matter of public concern." It is true that corporations with
overseas factories offer crucial perspectives on the public policy
debate about the merits of globalization. Arguably, therefore,
corporate speech in this context should be accorded the same
breathing room for error afforded to those critical of
globalization." No such protection is warranted, however, when
a corporation is merely refuting public criticism about its own
goods, services, or business operations in order to maintain
sales, as Nike had done here. A corporation's deceptive
statements of fact to consumers about its own business
operations cannot be legitimately seen as facilitating informed
public or private decisionmaking, and hence such statements
do not warrant protection under the First Amendment."
In order to provide some context for the Kasky
definition, this Note first appraises the Supreme Court's more
salient attempts to define commercial speech and its
justifications for according commercial speech some protection
from regulation. It then reviews the procedural history of the
Government may regulate commercial speech where the information
disseminated is false or misleading, and the speaker either knows the speech
is false or misleading, or has acted with reckless disregard for the falsity or
misleading nature of the speech. Governmental regulation of false or
misleading commercial speech does not chill constitutionally protected speech.
ACLU of Southern California Policy on Commercial Speech, Adopted Nov. 20, 2002,
available at http://reclaimdemocracy.org/nike/commercial-speech-socalaclu.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004). Professor Fisk has indicated that the amicus brief filed in Nike v.
Kasky "does track the ACLU-SC policy." E-mail from Catherine Fisk, American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California, to Susan Herman, Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School (Sept. 2, 2003, 3:36 pm EST) (on file with author).
14 Speech on a matter of public concern is generally considered close to core of
the First Amendment. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public
Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 (1990). I discuss this criticism further in Part V.A.
" Provided of course, that the corporation does not attempt to disguise
product marketing as participation in public debate. See infra text accompanying notes
34-38 and 152-55.
16 See infra Part II.B. See generally Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-25 (2000) (explaining how under the
Court's Meiklejohnian commercial speech jurisprudence, constitutional value only
attaches to communicative acts about commercial subjects that contribute to wise
democratic decisionmaking).
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dispute, and shows how Nike's statements about its business
operations functioned as commercial speech.
The Note also explains why the Kasky test will not
inappropriately chill speech and addresses the arguments
suggested against the California Supreme Court's ruling in
Kasky. It first observes that Nike's speech should not be
considered fully protected speech on a matter of public concern
by distinguishing debates about public policy from debates
about a corporation's own products, services, or business
operations. Second, the Note evaluates the efficacy of counter-
speech as -a less-restrictive alternative to regulation and
concludes it is inadequate in the area of commercial speech.
Finally, it rejects the suggestion that there is a slippery slope
from Kasky to regulation of political speech or even image
marketing.
This Note concedes that the California Supreme Court's
commercial speech test fits uncomfortably within traditional
legal and political paradigms. It nevertheless concludes that
because deceptive commercial speech does not further any
constitutional, free market, or autonomy values, courts should
follow Kasky's lead and adopt a commercial speech definition
that accurately reflects modern forms of commercial speech
and a diverse range of consumer preferences, for the limited
purpose of regulating commercial deception.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCIAL
SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Salient Attempts to Define Commercial Speech
The United States Supreme Court's first opportunity to
consider the collision of the First Amendment and commercial
speech came in 1942. The Court unanimously determined in
Valentine v. Chrestensen that the First Amendment does not
protect "purely commercial advertising."17  Valentine was
overruled in 1976, when Justice Douglas' mantra that the free
flow of commercial information is essential to private economic
decisionmaking'8 was finally adopted by a majority of the Court
17 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
" See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove Trustee, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari). Douglas had been a long-time advocate
of First Amendment protection for commercial speech. See Soontae An, From a
Business Pursuit to a Means of Expression: The Supreme Court's Disputes over
Commercial Speech from 1942 to 1976, 8 COMM. L. & POLY 201, 212-19 (2003).
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in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council9 (Virginia Pharmacy).
While Virginia Pharmacy suggested commercial speech
to be "speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction,""0 later decisions indicate the Court's awareness
that commercial speech can encompass much more. Indeed,
just a few years later the Court hit the other end of the
spectrum with its most inclusive formulation of commercial
speech to date. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
v. Public Service Commission of New York2 (Central Hudson),
the Court defined commercial speech as "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."" This would certainly have encompassed Nike's
communications (and more), but the Court has never actually
applied this test.
That is fortunate, because Central Hudson's formulation
of commercial speech is clearly overbroad." While a
corporation's legal obligations to shareholders ensure that
virtually all of its communications are economically motivated,
it is nevertheless capable of speaking in noncommercial
contexts. Conversely, forms of speech that have long been
protected under the Constitution may be solely related to
economic interests, including much of political speech.
19 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding that Virginia's prohibition of truthful
advertising of drug prices was unconstitutional). For an account of the period between
Valentine and Virginia Pharmacy, see An, supra note 18.
"0 425 U.S. at 762.
21 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2 Id. at 561.
23 Of course, Central Hudson is primarily maligned not for this overly broad
definition of commercial speech, but rather for the test it set out for permissible
regulation of truthful or non-misleading commercial speech. The test states:
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,
the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.
Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest.
The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the state's
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria.
First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest
could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech,
the excessive restrictions cannot survive.
Id. at 564.
24 As the Court later noted, "[uit is not clear that a professional's speech is
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that person's financial motivation for
speaking." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). But see C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 201-04 (1989); C. Edwin
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Only a few years later, the Court in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp.5 (Bolger) was faced with pamphlets
containing both contraceptive advertisements and information
about venereal disease and family planning. Though the
pamphlets did not explicitly propose a commercial transaction,
the Court recognized them as commercial speech. Despite this
finding, the Court was concerned that accurate and socially
helpful information might be prohibited. The resulting series of
plot twists in the decision made Bolger something akin to a
Who-Done-It (or perhaps more accurately a What-Did-It-Do).
First, the Court indicated that informational pamphlets
containing contraceptive advertisements "cannot be
characterized merely as proposals to engage in commercial
transactions."" Then the Court identified three qualities of
speech that in various combinations may or may not be
indicative of commercial speech.27 Finally, the Court concluded
that the pamphlets were commercial speech despite the fact
that they discussed important public issues such as venereal
disease and family planning,28 but held that because the
pamphlets "convey truthful information relevant to important
social issues such as family planning and the prevention of
venereal disease," they are protected by a "paramount" First
Amendment interest.' The state's interest in suppressing
potentially offensive advertisements was not sufficient to
justify regulation of advertising that "relates to activity which
is protected from unwarranted state interference.""
The Court observed that because Youngs' pamphlets
were in advertisement format, referred to the speaker's
products and were economically motivated, there was "strong
support" that they were commercial.3  This essentially
combined the definitions set forth in Central Hudson and
Virginia Pharmacy into an implied "totality of the
circumstances" test. As might have been expected, however,
Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's 'The
Value of Free Speech', 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982).
25 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
26 Id. at 65.
27 Id. at 66-67. See infra text accompanying note 31.
28 Id. at 67-68.
29 Id. at 69.
30 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69, 71-72 (citing Carey v. Pop'n Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S.
678, 701 (1977)).
31 Id. at 66-67.
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lower courts were unsure how to interpret Bolger." As
Professor Stern pointed out: "To harsher critics, the immediate
'misclassification' of Young's pamphlets epitomizes the broader
'imprecision and confusion' sewn by the Court's enumeration of
relevant but nonbinding factors. "'
In subsequent cases, the Court's attempts to categorize
speech became even more complicated by its increasing
recognition that much speech has both commercial and
noncommercial elements. When a communication contains
noncommercial speech "inextricably intertwined" with
commercial speech, it is labeled "hybrid" speech and is accorded
full First Amendment protection.34 The seeds for the category of
hybrid speech were sown in Central Hudson and Bolger,35 but
the Court did not fully explain what "inextricably intertwined"
meant until Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox3 (Fox). Confronted with speech on a university
campus that included both a Tupperware sale and home
economics information, the Court concluded that "[n]o law of
man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares
without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics
without selling housewares."" In other words, if it is possible to
parse the noncommercial from the commercial speech in a
particular mode of communication, the speech is not
inextricably intertwined and therefore the speaker receives the
32 See, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp., 227 B.R. 111, 117 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1999) (expressing uncertainty whether Bolger expanded the definition of commercial
speech); Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that under Bolger commercial speech would include a trade journal article written by
president of Amcast corporation generally referring to Amcast products).
Stern, supra note 1, at 86.
34 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
("[Wihere, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined,
we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to
another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical."). I discuss
this further infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
35 In Central Hudson, the Court drew a distinction between "direct comments
on public issues," which receive "the full panoply of First Amendment protections," and
statements about public issues "made only in the context of commercial transactions."
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563, n.5 (1980). In Bolger, the Court indicated informational pamphlets containing
contraceptive advertisements "cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage
in commercial transactions," but also noted that "[a]dvertisers should not be permitted
to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation
simply by including references to public issues." 463 U.S. at 66, 68. The negative
implication of the language in these decisions is that there might be some context in
which statements about public issues are not merely commercial.
36 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
37 Id. at 474; cf. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
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lesser First Amendment protection afforded commercial
speech.as
In recognizing a hybrid speech category, the United
States Supreme Court demonstrated a more sophisticated
awareness that speech can be multifaceted, but subsequent
cases did little to clarify the definition of commercial speech.
Indeed, while Fox echoed Virginia Pharmacy by suggesting
that speech proposing a commercial transaction is "the test for
identifying commercial speech," 9 the Court's conclusion in
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.4" affirmed its earlier indications
that commercial expression need not convey a specific proposal
to buy or sell." Occasionally the Court has even employed
contrasting notions of commercial speech in a single decision."
Given the diversity of corporate speech that has made
its way to the United States Supreme Court and its
concomitant struggle to define such speech, the Court has felt
it necessary to concede "the difficulty of drawing bright lines
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category. ""3
38 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. Even when courts properly understand the United
States Supreme Court's instructions for dealing with hybrid speech, however, much
speech is difficult to categorize, with the result that differing protections have been
applied in analogous-and in one case identical-situations. Compare Keimer v. Buena
Vista Books Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (1999) (finding misleading or false quotations
from content of book on book's cover are commercial speech because functioning as an
advertisement), with Lacoff v. Buena Vista Publishing, Inc., 183 Misc. 2d 600, 604, 705
N.Y.S.2d 183 (2000) (classifying the exact same misleading quotations on the cover of
the same book as noncommercial speech protected by the First Amendment).
" Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
40 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995) (holding that alcohol content information on
beer labels is commercial speech).
41 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (explaining that trade names
are a form of commercial speech); accord San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (trademark is commercial speech even
when used in connection with an event that is fully protected by First Amendment);
Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998)
(beer labels depicting frog making obscene gesture are commercial speech); but see
Transp. Alternatives, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (use of
corporate logo at political bike event not commercial speech).
41 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
(defining commercial speech as "[e]xpression concerning purely commercial
transactions," but finding a lawyer's in-person solicitation, which included explaining
Ohio's guest statute and other legal information, to be commercial speech) (emphasis
added).
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993).
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B. Autonomy, the Free Market, and the Facilitation of Wise
Public Decisions - Why the Court Protects Commercial
Speech
The enduring moral force behind the Court's decision in
Virginia Pharmacy to accord commercial speech some limited
protection from state regulation was its recognition that
government will rarely be justified in suppressing accurate
speech of any kind." Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun
rejected Virginia's "highly paternalistic" argument that the ban
on advertising by pharmacies was justified because it protected
consumers, and suggested instead "that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed."45
This autonomy principle animates Blackmun's two
justifications for striking down state regulation of accurate
commercial speech. First, he reasoned that when consumers
utilize comparative pricing data in making their purchasing
decisions, they effect "the proper allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system."" Second, Blackmun alluded to the link
between accessibility of commercial information and public
decisionmaking, in that commercial speech helps citizens to
make informed decisions about the extent to which America's
predominantly free market economy should be regulated or
altered.47
As a justification for protecting accurate commercial
speech, the efficient allocation of resources in a free market
system is logically sound and certainly resonates with much of
modem legal zeitgeist. Nevertheless, it is not a constitutional
value by which the extent of First Amendment protection can
be measured.' As Robert Post put it, "The First Amendment
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
Id. at 769-70.
46 Id. at 765. This, of course, is the argument that Justice Douglas had been
urging in the previous decades. See An, supra note 18.
47 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry
information of import to significant issues of the day.").
48 See Post, supra note 16, at 11. See also Geyh, supra note 3, at 11 ("it cannot
seriously be suggested that the promotion of economic efficiency and free enterprise are
values underlying the first amendment."); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1212, 1226-27 (1983) ("It was strange indeed for the Court to suggest that the
first amendment has been Chicago-school economics travelling [sic] incognito for all
these years.").
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cannot be understood as a repository of microeconomic theory,
as the champion of a particular (and contested) view of proper
market functioning."" Keeping the market efficient remains,
however, a powerful policy reason for limiting state regulation
of accurate commercial speech.
However, inasmuch as commercial speech also
contributes to informed public decisionmaking, it
unquestionably justifies constitutional protection. When
consumers receive accurate information about the prices of a
commodity, they are better able to make autonomous and
democratic decisions, including decisions about whether the
commodity should be subject to government subsidies. Thus,
commercial speech can be seen as furthering the Meiklejohnian
conception of the First Amendment: protecting speech to
facilitate wise decisions.'
Both of the Court's rationales for protecting the "free
flow of commercial information" are predicated on the interest
the public has in receiving the information." While it has been
argued that commercial speech also promotes a speaker's
constitutional rights,52 there is near unanimous consensus
among commentators that commercial speech is only protected
49 Post, supra note 16, at 10.
'0 See id. at 13-15.
5' Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764.
52 For example, Martin Redish points out that because deciding to form a
corporation in the first place is an "exercise of free will," we should "view the
corporation's speech as a means of facilitating the self-development of those who
formed and operate the corporation." Martin Redish, First Amendment Theory and the
Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24
N. KY. L. REV. 553, 571 (1997). I disagree. As Professor Geyh has pointed out, "it is
illogical and ill-advised to conclude that artificial entities are capable of self-fulfillment
or self-expression deserving of First Amendment protection. This is not to say that
corporate speech is undeserving of First Amendment protection. Rather, it is simply to
say that self-expression, self-realization or self-fulfillment are attributes of speech that
only natural persons are capable of enjoying, and that the constitutional value of
corporate speech cannot be derived from its value to the speaker." Geyh, supra note 3,
at 30-31. See also Post, supra note 16, at 12 ("[W~e most naturally understand persons
who are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance their commercial interests.
• . ."); BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 196 ("[Commercial speech] lacks the
crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization that are central to
justifications for the constitutional protection of speech . . . ."); Victor Brudney,
Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE
L.J. 235, 240 (1982) (corporations "are accorded 'personality' in order to create a
mechanism for saving transaction costs in business dealings, not to create autonomous
beings"); Geyh, supra note 3, at 31 (summarizing Shiffrin's argument that
"ER]egardless of whether speech incident to the sale of goods... is capable of furthering
the speaker's self-expression, it is not ordinarily so utilized. Rather, it is primarily a
vehicle for proposing and implementing commercial transactions.").
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for the value it has to the listener." In contrast is
noncommercial speech, for example political speech, which
serves both the speaker's constitutional interest in
participating and the listener's interest in receiving. An
important implication follows from this distinction: Because
the constitutional and economic policy values of commercial
speech extend no further than the speech's use to the listener,
non-deceptiveness is a prerequisite to its utility, and therefore
to its protection.
III. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE
DISPUTE BETWEEN NIKE AND KASKY
In the mid-1990s, awareness about the negative aspects
of globalization swelled." While by no means the only company
to face allegations that some of its products are produced in
overseas factories with sweatshop-like conditions, Nike has
probably shouldered the most criticism.' Prominent examples
53 See, e.g., Helen Norton, You Can't Ask (or Say) That: The First Amendment
and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
727, 743 (2003) ("[T]he constitutional salience of commercial speech turns on its ability
to facilitate its recipients' informed decisionmaking."); Geyh, supra note 3, at 5-6
(identifying one factor that may justify regulation of commercial speech as the fact that
"the audience, rather than the speaker, is the one whose first amendment interests are
at issue").
. While there is essentially no such thing as a false idea in public discourse
(see Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)), the First Amendment has not
been found to protect false commercial statements. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of
advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression
of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity.") (citation omitted); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (explaining that the First Amendment's protection for false
statements did not apply to the commercial speech at issue); Norton, supra note 53, at
754 (noting that the Virginia Pharmacy Court's distaste for the "highly paternalistic
approach" that seemed transparent in the suppression of truthful information is most
consistent with "a view of commercial speech as constitutionally valuable when - but
only when - it accurately informs individuals' decisionmaking among lawful
alternatives."); Geyh, supra note 3, at 6 ("the concerns that warrant a privilege of sorts
to disseminate falsehoods outside the commercial sphere do not apply with equal force
to speech within the commercial sphere"). For the more difficult question of whether
knowing falsehoods in areas such as political speech can be constitutionally prohibited,
see infra note 185 and accompanying text.
The frequency of exposds in 1995 and 1996 on exploitative labor practices
by big name labels prompted Andrew Ross, director of American Studies at New York
University, to term that period "The Year of the Sweatshop." See NAOMI KLEIN, No
LoGo 327 (2002).
6 There have been more than 1,500 news articles and columns written about
scandals involving Nike's labor practices. See KLEIN, supra note 55, at 366. Whether or
not this profuse coverage is justified, "Nike - as the market leader - has become a
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of media criticism of globalization in general and of Nike in
particular included a CBS "48 Hours" special on working
conditions in Nike factories in Southeast Asia,57 a New York
Times report on abusive treatment of workers following a
strike at a Javanese factory,m and Bob Herbert's Op-Ed in the
New York Times, "Nike's Bad Neighborhood," 9 all of which
were published in 1996.
On June 18, 1996, the Director of Sports Marketing at
Nike, Inc. sent letters to university presidents and athletic
directors, making several specific factual claims about the labor
practices in Nike's factories "around the globe." The letter
identified itself as a response to "false and irresponsible"
accusations that Nike uses child labor in the production of its
goods. It claimed that "wherever Nike operates around the
globe," it "strictly prohibits child labor, and certifies compliance
with applicable government regulations regarding minimum
wage and overtime, as well as occupational health and safety,
environmental regulations, worker insurance and equal
lightening rod for ... broader resentment. It has been latched on to as the essential
story of the extremes of the current global economy: the disparity between those who
profit from Nike's success and those who are exploited by it are so gaping that a child
could see what is wrong with this picture." Id. at 377.
57 See Editorial, Swoosh Goes the First Amendment, WALL ST. J., May 14,
2002, at A18 (urging that Nike's statements should be protected because they were in
response to the CBS "48 Hours" special and other public criticism).
58 See KLEIN, supra note 55, at 328.
59 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, Nike's Bad Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996,
at A29.
See Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 685-86 (2003) (letter from Nike to
universities attached as appendix to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissing
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) [hereinafter "Letter to Universities"]. For
the sake of concision and the reader's convenience, my analysis will primarily consider
this letter sent to the universities. That was the principle communication analyzed by
the California Supreme Court, which needed only find sufficient evidence that Kasky's
complaint alleged some commercial speech by Nike, as the case was before it on a
motion for summary judgment by Nike. It should be noted, however, that Kasky
alleged there were nine communications from Nike that should be subject to
commercial speech analysis:
[A] two-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's Director of Sports Marketing
to university presidents and directors of athletics; a 33-page illustrated
pamphlet, entitled 'Nike Production Primer'; a posting with Nike's logo on
Nike's website; a posting of a press release with Nike's logo on Nike's website;
a three-page document on Nike's letterhead with Nike's logo; a press release
with Nike's logo; a five-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's Director of
Labor Practices to the Chief Executive Officer, YWCA of America; a two-page
letter with Nike's logo from Nike's PR Manager, Europe, to International
Restructuring Education Network Europe; a letter to the editor of The New
York Times from Nike's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.




opportunity provisions."1 The letter expressed hope that the
recipient would "find this information useful in discussions
with faculty and students who may be equally disturbed by
these charges."2
Armed in part with a leaked Ernst & Young audit
describing one of Nike's factories,' California activist Marc
Kasky filed suit against Nike in San Francisco Superior Court
on April 20, 1998, alleging that the statements in Nike's letters
to the athletic directors and other communications were "false
representations of fact about the conditions under which
[Nike's products] are made."' He further alleged that Nike
made these representations "with intent to induce members of
the public to buy its products and in order to maintain and/or
increase its sales and profits.""
Nike demurred and in early 1999 the court held a
hearing to determine whether Nike's allegedly false and
misleading statements were commercial speech. After
considering the issue, the court sustained the demurrers
without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's judgment, concluding that Nike's statements were
noncommercial speech.6 After the California Supreme Court
reversed the demurrers, the United States Supreme Court
granted Nike's petition for certiorari. 7
At oral argument in front of the Supreme Court,
Kasky's attorney Paul Hoeber began by emphasizing "Mr.
Kasky never bought any Nikes. He never bought any. I suppose
now he never will."' The unique benefit of Kasky's lack of
patronage was that while his lack of injury foreclosed standing
in federal court because of Article III's case or controversy
61 See Letter to Universities, supra note 60.
62 Id.
The audit had been prepared at Nike's request. See Keith Hammond,
Leaked Audit: Nike Factory Violated Worker Laws, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 7, 1997,
available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1997/11nike.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2004). The leak was Dara O'Rourke of the University of California at
Berkeley. Nike was naturally enraged with O'Rourke, but perhaps this transgression
against the company later instilled O'Rourke's more favorable independent review of
the same Vietnamese factory with more credibility than it otherwise might have had.
See KLEIN, supra note 55, at 376.
Respondent's Brief at 1, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (outlining the procedural
history of the litigation).
67 Nike v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
68 Respondent's Oral Argument at 30, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(No. 02-575).
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requirement, he could still bring an action against Nike in
California under that state's Unfair Competition and False
Advertising Laws.69 Considering how easy it would have been to
go out and buy a pair of Nike shoes, it appears that Mr. Kasky
(and his legal team) preferred to have no Article III shoe to
stand in, perhaps fearing a federal court would be more
sympathetic to Nike's First Amendment defense.
In any event, lack of jurisdiction was but one of three
reasons Justice Stevens cited as "independently sufficient
reasons" for dismissing the certiorari as improvidently
granted. ° The already flagging anticipation that there would be
federal precedent one way or the other on the issue was
completely abandoned when the case was settled on September
12, 2003.'
69 The relevant aspect of California's Unfair Competition and False
Advertising Laws is its so-called "private attorney general" provision, which allows an
unfair competition action to be brought "by a city attorney in any city and county in the
name of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the
complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by any person
acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public." CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17204 (1993). The normative and legal merits of a private attorney general
statute are beyond the scope of this Note. Given the fervor of the international anti-
Nike movement it is probably fair to conjecture that there is sufficient incentive for an
activist to bring a suit against the corporation even without the potential for personal
gain. This may be a legitimate point of criticism of California statutory law, but not of
the California Supreme Court's conception of commercial speech. Moreover, California
has an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute, which its
courts have used effectively to deter harassing litigation that has no merit. See, e.g.,
Bernado v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(affirming dismissal of SLAPP lawsuit brought by private attorney general alleging
that Planned Parenthood's statements about the safety of abortions on its website were
misleading under Kasky and upholding award of $77,835 in attorney's fees to Planned
Parenthood).
70 Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in dismissal of
certiorari as improvidently granted). The other reasons suggested by Stevens were that
"the judgment entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257" and that "the reasons for avoiding the premature
adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case." Id.
at 658. Still, the dismissal came as some surprise given that the Court had heard oral
arguments (with extended time) and considered three-dozen amicus briefs.
71 The only disclosed term of the settlement was an agreement to donate $1.5
million to the Fair Labor Association, a D.C.-based group that monitors corporate labor
practices globally and tries to educate workers. See Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case
Over Firms' Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8. To put this figure in
context, note that it is about half of one day's advertising budget for the corporation.
Press Release, ReclaimDemocracy.org, Kasky v. Nike Inc. Settled Participants Pleased,
Many Activists Inflamed (Sept. 12, 2003), at http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/
nike/nikesettles-lawsuit.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
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IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S TEST FOR
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
As we saw in Part II, the United States Supreme Court
has "recited various descriptions, indicia, and disclaimers
without settling upon a precise and comprehensive definition"
of commercial speech." While an argument can be made that
the Court's "I know it when I see it" approach in this area
provides it with the flexibility necessary for dealing with
unanticipated forms of speech,73 the result has been that lower
courts frequently struggle to determine what level of protection
Supreme Court precedent affords the difficult-to-categorize
speech at issue."
In Kasky, the California Supreme Court attempted to
synthesize the principles underlying the United States
Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions into a workable
test for evaluating whether modern corporate marketing
communications should be subjected to commercial deception
laws. The test asks whether the speech in question is "directed
by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience," makes
"representations of fact about the speaker's own business
operations," and does so "for the purpose of promoting sales of
its products."7 If the answer to each of these questions is yes,
then the speech is commercial, but only for the limited purpose
of subjecting it to false advertising laws.7 '
72 Stern, supra note 1, at 56. See also Allan Tananbaum, Note, "New and
Improved". Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commercial from Noncommercial
Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1821, 1836 (1988) ("the Court has resorted to a series of
negatives: that speech takes the form of an advertisement does not render it
commercial; selfish, even pecuniary motives of the speaker do not by themselves
transform expression into commercial expression; and the inclusion of pronouncements
of issues of public concern in an advertisement is of little help in the determination of
whether the speech is commercial."); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the
Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1184-85 (1982) ("[Tlhe
Supreme Court, for all it has said about commercial speech, has conspicuously avoided
saying just what it is.").
73 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 1, at 87-88 ("Viewed as a whole, the Court's
pronouncements on the nature of commercial speech possess as much clarity and
coherence as can reasonably be expected in modem First Amendment jurisprudence...
. In fact, the Court's avoidance of mechanical tests and rigid categorization has
promoted recognition of reasoned distinctions among expression in various commercial
settings.").
74 See, e.g., David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial
Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 383 (1990) (noting that inadequacies in the Court's
descriptions of commercial speech have forced the lower courts to guess at the proper
way to categorize speech in a given case).
75 Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 247 (2002).
76 Id. at 256.
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A. Consumer Preferences and Corporate Marketing Indicate
that Statements of Fact about Business Operations Can
Be Commercial Speech
In holding that commercial speech can include
representations of fact not only about a speaker's products and
services, but also about the speaker's business operations, the
California Supreme Court arguably expanded the subject
matter of commercial speech. Business operations, as the court
explained, include "statements about the manner in which the
products are manufactured, distributed, or sold, about repair or
warranty services that the seller provides to purchasers of the
product, or about the identity or qualifications of persons who
manufacture, distribute, sell, service, or endorse the product."77
Since at least the 1990s there has been a significant
market of consumers whose decisions to purchase or invest are
influenced by concerns about the seller's business operations."8
This market appears to be continuing to grow and, by 2003,
total assets under professional management screened for one or
more social issues had risen to $2.16 trillion."9 This figure
reflects a seven percent increase in issue-screened portfolios
since 2001, while during that same time the broader universe
of managed portfolios fell by four percent.0 The integration of
criteria like commitment to diversity, working conditions, or
impact on the environment of production into investment
decisionmaking is not simply due to a rise in activism; rather,
many "social investors believe that careful attention to social
factors can help identify companies with higher quality
" Id. at 257.
78 See John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational
Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 472 (1999-2000) (noting the
large portion of consumers influenced by social issues); John M. Church, A Market
Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons From the Economics of Information, 79
MINN. L. REV. 245, 251-54 (1994) (summarizing the results of polls and data on
consumers, and concluding that one in two consumers have made a purchasing choice
based on a product's effect on the environment).
79 SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States, at i, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.socialinvest.org
(last visited Aug. 26, 2004). $2.16 trillion is a materially significant percentage of the
current total of all investment assets under professional management in the United
States ($19.2 trillion). Id. at 1. Of course, the trend of rising investor preferences for
corporations with responsible wages and working conditions is not limited to America.
See, e.g., SOCIALFUNDS.COM, Canadian Firm Launches Social Index, Feb. 16, 2000, at
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/articlel60.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2004).
80 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends, supra note 79, at i.
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management, that can produce higher returns to investors.""1
Prudent bankers may be reluctant to invest in overseas
companies that tolerate abusive treatment of their labor forces
for fear of attendant instability, both within the company and
between the company and the local government." Consumers
may believe that workers who are well-rested, safe, and
adequately compensated will produce higher quality goods.
Given the importance of social issues to investors and
consumers, it comes as no surprise that even as early as 1993
companies spent about $1 billion on cause-related marketing (a
150% increase from 1990).' It is not uncommon for corporations
to include ethics policies "in marketing materials intended to
impress 'socially conscious' customers and investors."' Clearly
Nike has long recognized the impact of this market. In fact, in
1998 Nike's CEO Phil Knight attributed Nike's disappointing
financial results in 1997 and 1998 to concerns about alleged
sweatshop labor. 5 In a 1998 letter sent to a California
newspaper editor, Nike explicitly drew the connection between
its labor practices and consumer purchasing habits, writing
that "[c]onsumers are savvy and want to know they support
companies with good products and practices" and that "Idluring
the shopping season, we encourage shoppers to remember that
Nike is the industry's leader in improving factory conditions." 6
The consumer market most central to the dispute
between Nike and Kasky is the schools and universities where
Nike has or would like to have sponsorship and bulk-
purchasing contracts, which are of no small economic
8' Brief of Amici Curiae Domini Social Investments, L.L.C. et al, at 10 n.3,
Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
82 See Anderson, supra note 78, at 472; see also Diane F. Orentlicher &
Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on
Business Investors in China, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 66, 97 (1993-1994) (discussing
the correlation between human rights violations and investment risk).
83 See Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product:
Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. MARKETING 68 (Winter
1997); see also Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 82, at 97 ("[A]t a time when consumers
are increasingly assertive in demanding that the products they purchase be produced
in a manner deemed 'socially responsible,' it is scarcely possible to draw a bright line
between corporations' goal of maximizing profits and social expectations that they
behave responsibly.").
s4 Andrew B. Cripe, Employee and Director Accountability to Shareholders:
Doing Business for Business Owners, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 153, 156 (2003).
85 See Phillip H. Knight, Cover Letter to Annual Report to the Shareholders
(1998), available at http://www.sec.gov; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Brief of Domini
Social Investments LLC, KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., and Harrington
Investments, Inc. at 6, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
8 See Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (2002).
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consequence. 7 Campuses like the University of North Carolina,
Duke University, Stanford, Penn State, and Arizona State are
among many where concern about labor practices have
threatened contract formation or renewal with Nike." At the
University of California at Irvine, for example, such concern
eventually led the athletic department to switch to Converse.8
Nike's letters to athletic directors about its own business
operations are appropriately seen, therefore, as speech
intended to preserve its contracts with universities - or more
generally, its economic interests.'
Because concerns about the conditions under which
products are made are shaping consumer purchasing or
investing choices and corporate marketing choices, such
information should be granted the same limited protection as
other commercial speech, and corporations should not be
prevented from using such information to make sales.
Conversely, however, corporations should not be permitted to
thwart the efficient allocation of resources by communicating
deceptive information about their business operations. Indeed,
as Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky pointed out in an
amicus brief during the Kasky litigation, if such statements
were not considered commercial speech, many undesirable
commercial deceptions would be possible." At the very least,
businesses could get away with deceptive claims that they
should know are false or misleading.2 For example, a
corporation could advertise that its food is kosher without any
duty to at least reasonably ensure the accuracy of this
statement. Like the Nike claims at issue in Kasky, this would
be a statement of fact about the conditions under which the
seller's products are made. Of course, no one would suggest
that consumers who observe kosher dietary laws do not care
87 KLEIN, supra note 55, at 406.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Of course, critics of Kasky have argued that this background is precisely
why Nike's speech should be protected from liability for deception. See infra Part V.A.
91 See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress,
Representatives Dennis Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine Brown, and Bob Filner at
10-14, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). Some of my examples of the
undesirable communications that could result if business operations are not considered
commercial speech are based on arguments posed in this brief. However, Professor Fisk
and Professor Chemerinsky do not seem to distinguish between negligent and knowing
deceptions, a distinction that I feel is important. See id.
92 Knowing falsehoods would be presumably still be actionable, for example
under fraud laws. See infra notes 158 and 185 and accompanying text.
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more about the conditions under which the food products they
purchase are made (e.g., not involving work on Saturdays) than
about price or the taste.
Other examples abound: corporations would be free of
responsibility for negligent claims that their products were
produced without pesticides or in other environmentally
sustainable methods,9 that their tuna was caught in a dolphin-
safe manner, or that their cosmetics were produced without
animal testing. In fact, if factual statements about business
operations are not commercial speech, a seller could be free to
claim its goods were made in the United States, even if the
claim was materially misleading (i.e., only final assembly in
the U.S.). This would run contrary to the policy underlying
federal statutes regulating "made in USA" labeling on various
goods. Such statutes were enacted in recognition of the fact
that a factual statement to consumers about business
operations can be extremely important to the proper allocation
of resources, and should therefore be reasonably regulated to
the extent that it is deceptive.94
In the end, a consumer's particular motivation for
buying or investing is irrelevant to the prejudice incurred when
the consumer does not get what she pays for, as the United
9' There has been some commercial speech litigation involving false
environmental advertising. Some courts have in fact ruled that such statements are
commercial speech under United States Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Ass'n of
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1994) (Commercial speech
analysis applies to California statute prohibiting advertisements or product labels that
claim a certain environmental attribute - for example "ozone-friendly" - unless the
product meets the statutory definition of that quality because "the statute regulates
representations concerning specific consumer goods which takes the form of
advertisements or product labels [and] specifically requires that the representation be
made about specific consumer goods which a firm manufactures or distributes" and
because "there is little doubt that by touting the environmental benefits of consumer
products," the sellers "hope to capture a portion of the "green market."). Indeed,
"[n]early one in every two consumers has altered his or her purchasing decisions to
help protect the environment." Church, supra note 78, at 251. See generally David Hoch
& Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and the
Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441 (1994).
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 250.7(a)(1) (1998) (regulating prerequisite conditions
for "Made in USA" labeling on furniture); 16 C.F.R. § 300.25(a) (1998) (regulating
prerequisite conditions for "Made in USA" labeling on wool products); 16 C.F.R. §
303.33(a)(2) (1998) (regulating prerequisite conditions for "Made in USA" labeling on
textile fiber items). Moreover, there are many such statutes regulating what attributes
can be claimed about the conditions under which a product was made, including many
that touch on areas of public concern. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1231.01 (2004)
(regulating prerequisite conditions for representations that product was made by
Native Americans); MINN. STAT. § 325F.47 (2003) (regulating prerequisite conditions
for representations that product was made by a blind person).
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States Supreme Court has made clear at least since 1934.15
Proof that the product asked for (say, a shoe made by American
workers, to take a modern example) is of the same quality as
the product received (say, a shoe made in Indonesia) is
similarly irrelevant to whether the consumer is prejudiced."
The market should accurately reflect consumer preferences,
whatever they are. This protects both consumers in their
private economic decisionmaking and competitors who are
honest about where their products are made, who makes them,
and under what conditions.
B. Why the Kasky Test is Acceptable
1. Verifiability
The California Supreme Court pointed out that when
Nike described its own labor policies and the working
conditions in factories where its products are made, the
company "addressed matters within its own knowledge."97 The
court emphasized that because "Nike was making factual
representations about its own business operations,"" the
company "was in a position to readily verify the truth of any
factual assertions it made on these topics."' Commercial speech
is thought to be more verifiable, and therefore less deserving of
breathing room for inadvertent deception, because the speaker
is uniquely positioned to know about her own products or
services. ° While the United States Supreme Court's reliance
on this counterbalancing characteristic has been questioned,'°
9' See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) ("The consumer is
prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied with something else.
... In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may
be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps ignorance.").
Cf id. at 77-78 (rejecting the argument that if the quality of white pine
and yellow pine is the same, a buyer who asks for one and gets the other is not
prejudiced).
97 Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (2002).
9 Id.
9 Id.
'0o See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771, n.24 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564, n.6 (1980).
'o1 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 52 at 568 ("Surely, the assertions contained in
Consumer Reports Magazine are no more or less objectively verifiable than are the
claims of commercial advertisers."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 635-38 (1990) (noting that "the way
advertising is actually practiced today," commercial speech is no longer so verifiable);
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old
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the Court continues to invoke it as a common sense distinction
from pure speech, and, in general, the proposition seems well
founded.' °' Corporate speakers are likely to know, or easily be
able to verify, the materials used in their products. Likewise, a
commercial speaker is likely to know, or easily be able to verify,
the wages paid to its workers, the amount of overtime put in by
its workers, the ages of its workers, and where its factories are
located. Thus, in addition to functioning like other commercial
speech in the market, a commercial speaker's statements of
fact about her own business operations are certainly as
verifiable as other commercial speech.
2. Hardiness
The Supreme Court has also not seemed to worry much
about any chilling effect on commercial speech.10 3 The reason is
that there is a strong economic incentive to speak about one's
products or services in order to compete in the market.' This is
also true of commercial speech about business operations,
although admittedly to a lesser extent because business
operations are normally not for sale. It is realistic to assume
that a corporation will assess the costs of promoting its
business operations differently post-Kasky and that as a result
some speech about a corporation's business operations will not
reach the public. It is also safe to assume, however, that
corporations will continue to market business operation
information and to address materially inaccurate information
about their business operations, °' given the portion of
Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 297 (1987) (pointing out that it can be as difficult to
verify whether commercial speech is misleading as it is for more fully protected speech,
like political speech).
102 See Geyh, supra note 3, at 23 ("We are dealing in 'common-sense' general
impressions here, not mathematical axioms, and the fact that less than all speech in
the commercial arena may be subject to objective verification does not refute the
accuracy of the generalization, or eviscerate the utility of the distinction to the extent it
applies.").
103 Post supra note 16, at 35.
104 But see id. at 33 (noting that the "empirical assumption that commercial
speech is more sturdy than public discourse is suspect"); Kozinski & Banner, supra
note 101, at 635-38 (arguing that there is little support for the empirical assumption
that that "economic motives render speech more durable than other motives" and even
if these are characteristics of commercial speech, it is unclear why less protection for
commercial speech is therefore justified).
105 Deborah E. Glass & Thomas H. Clarke Jr., Beware of Clever Metaphors:
Kasky v. Nike Could Be Harmful to Your Company's Health, 22 NO. 4 ACC Docket 80,
90 (2004) (Recommending that "if statements of product quality are made, such as the
reliability of software, quality assurance and quality control procedures should be
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consumers whose investing and purchasing decisions are
influenced by such information. 6
We do not have to look very far for some strong evidence
of the sturdiness of speech about business operations. In spite
of repeated threats to discontinue providing any information
about its factory conditions should it lose its litigation with
California activist Marc Kasky,' °' Nike now provides more
extensive information related to the working conditions in its
factories on its website than it did before the suit settled.'°8 Its
Code of Conduct - which formed the basis of the letters to
university directors of which Marc Kasky complained"9 -
asserts that "[w]herever Nike operates around the globe we are
guided by this Code of Conduct and we bind our contractors to
these principles." 0 Among many statements of fact about the
specifics of the conditions in its factories, Nike asserts that it
binds its partners to "not use forced labor in any form," to "not
employ any person below the age of 18 to produce footwear,"
and to "provide[] each employee at least the minimum wage."
Moreover, in a twelve-page file explaining its labor practices
and policies, Nike claims that:
[Any] Nike contractor found employing any worker under our age
standards must (a) remove the child from the workplace, (b) continue
to pay that worker's basic weekly wage, (c) place that worker in an
accredited local school and pay fees to keep them there, and (d) agree
to re-hire that worker when reaching the Nike minimum age.
Factories that refuse to follow these steps will lose our business."'
The potential influence of these statements is somewhat
enervated by Nike's concession that its standards are difficult
undertaken to assure that the requisite quality does indeed exist and that the error
rate is statistically insignificant.").
1o6 See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 82, at 97 ("[A]t a time when
consumers are increasingly assertive in demanding that the products they purchase be
produced in a manner deemed 'socially responsible,' it is scarcely possible to draw a
bright line between corporations' goal of maximizing profits and social expectations
that they behave responsibly."). See generally Part IV.A.
107 See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 39, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No.
02-575).
"" See NIKE, INC., WORKERS AND FACTORIES, at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25 (last updated Jan. 2004).
o9 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
110 See NIKE, INC., NIKE CODE OF CONDUCT, available at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/gc/mp/pdf/English.pdf (last updated Jan. 2004).
I NIKE, INC., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: LABOR PRACTICES, at 30




to enforce.2 Finally, the site provides information about Nike's
internal compliance standards and about independent audits of
its factories."3 In sum, Nike appears not to have "shut down its
public relations office."" Although after Kasky the corporation
is being "much more careful when it makes claims to influence
consumers about how it treats its overseas workers,".. it has
concluded that it is worthwhile to keep speaking on the matter.
The portion of the market that cares about business practices is
too important to ignore; it would make little business sense to
refrain from providing as much specific, positive, non-deceptive
information as possible. Thus, while it is hard to predict how
much chill will result (beyond chilling deceptive corporate
marketing"), it seems that Kasky has yet to have a significant
impact on the willingness of corporations to continue their
public relations.''7
11 See, e.g., NIKE, INC., NIKE CODE OF CONDUCT at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=code#code ("While our policy
is clear, we have learned that child labor presents many challenges, including falsified
age records.") (last updated Jan. 2004).
113 NIKE, INC., Nikebiz: Responsibility: Workers and Factories: Compliance,
Monitoring, & Assessment, at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&
cat=compliance (last updated Jan. 2004).
14 See Toni Muzi Falconi, Nike vs. Kasky: Update Note, Global Alliance for
Public Relations and Communication Management Website, at http://www.globalpr.
org/news/stories/nike-kasky2.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2004) (concluding after an
August 12, 2003 teleconference with Nike's VP of corporate affairs and a Nike attorney
that "I do not believe that public relations professionals within organizations, or within
agencies, or consultants now always require their lawyers to check every single
statement, press release, public appearance, publication and web page.").
' See Tony Mauro, Justices get Nike out of their hair - for now, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE, June 27, 2003 (quoting Public Citizen Litigation Group
attorney Alan Morrison's prediction as to how settlement of the suit will affect Nike), at
www.firstamendmentcenter.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
"6 See David Graulich, Press Release: Write in Haste . . . Repent, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 14, 2002, at D12. (admitting that PR consultants and the firms that employ them
were watching the dispute between Nike and Kasky "to see if it sets limits on how far
one can lawfully go in a press release").
17 A cursory survey of other major corporate websites indicates that they too
continue to make statements of fact about their business operations. See e.g., WAL-
MART, SWEATSHOP ALLEGATIONS, News Center / Statements / Sweatshop Allegations
("We require suppliers to ensure that every factory conforms to local workplace laws
and that there is no illegal child or forced labor.") at http://www.walmartstores.com
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004); LEVI-STRAUSS & CO., SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY / GLOBAL
SOURCING & OPERATING GUIDELINES (identifying numerous specific workplace
conditions that must be satisfied as prerequisites for initiating and renewing
investment and business contracts) at http://www.levistrauss.comlresponsibility/
conduct/guidelines.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); REEBOK WEBSITE, GUIDE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REEBOK HUMAN RIGHTS PRODUCTION STANDARDS 10 ("Reebok will
not select business partners who pay less than the minimum wage required by
applicable law or who pay less than the prevailing local industry wage.") at
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3. The Limited Purpose of the Kasky Test
While many courts and commentators have attempted
to do what the Supreme Court could not - propose a
comprehensive definition for commercial speech "' - the
California Supreme Court may be the first to articulate a test
for classifying speech that is strictly limited to the context of
commercial deception actions. This has significant advantages.
First, Kasky avoids what the United States Supreme
Court still occasionally permits: regulation of non-deceptive
speech."' Thus, as broad a net as the Kasky definition may cast,
it will never lead a court to even consider whether to uphold
the suppression of contraceptive advertisements in pamphlets
containing accurate information about venereal disease,2° the
disciplining of attorneys who non-deceptively solicit clients,21
the prohibition of accurate advertisements for gambling,'22 or
http://www.reebok.com/static/global/initiatives/rights/pdf/ReebokHRGuide.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2004).
118 See, e.g., Post, supra note 16, at 25 (Commercial speech is "the set of
communicative acts about commercial subjects that within a public communicative
sphere convey info of relevance to democratic decision making but that do not
themselves form part of public discourse."); Geyh, supra note 3, at 5-6 (advocating a
multifactor case-by-case analysis for speech, in which the level of judicial scrutiny
afforded depends upon the presence or absence of factors including the opportunity for
timely expression of alternative viewpoints, the extent to which truth or falsity can be
objectively verified, the presence of a commercial incentive to exaggerate product or
service attributes, the likelihood of audience manipulation, the hardiness of the speech
and the constitutional implications of compelling additional speech); Todd F. Simon,
Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather than Content, 20 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 215, 244 (1984-1985) (Commercial speech is "calculated expression in the form of
advertising or promotional material which is designed by the speaker to affect
consumer purchases on the basis of information or impressions contained therein
resulting in action which is harmful to individual consumers or to society as a whole.");
Nadir N. Tawil, Comment, Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 HOW. L.J.
1015, 1027 (1984) ("Commercial speech is an expression designed primarily to promote
a commercial product, service, or a business interest."); Richard M. Alderman,
Commercial Entities' NonCommercial Speech: A Contradiction in Terms, 1982 UTAH L.
REV. 731, 744-45 (commercial speech is any speech by a commercial entity).
"' See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding
state bar rules prohibiting lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to
victims or their relatives for 30 days following an accident, or from accepting referrals
obtained in violation of that prohibition).
120 Cf Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (considering
whether to uphold state regulation on truthful commercial information).
"' Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state
regulation of truthful in-person solicitation by an attorney).
122 Cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (sustaining restriction of accurate advertisements for casinos).
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limits on the placement of tobacco or alcohol advertisements.'23
In short, the Central Hudson framework for regulating truthful
commercial speech will never be triggered by the Kasky
analysis. 124
Second, unlike the United States Supreme Court's
attempts at definition, which aim to categorize speech as
commercial (or not) irrespective of the regulation to be imposed
on the speech at issue, the Kasky limited purpose test hones in
on the autonomy theme underlying the judicially recognized
rationales for protecting commercial speech. The Kasky test is
in fact predicated on the idea that consumers should get as
much accurate commercial information as possible.22 Both the
constitutional value of facilitating public decisionmaking and
the economic efficiency value of properly allocating resources in
our free market system depend upon the free flow of accurate
information.' If Professor Post is correct that any definition of
commercial speech will necessarily be predicated on the values
that commercial speech is intended to serve,' then Kasky is at
least a good step in the right direction.'
Because it is clear that "ambiguities may exist at the
margins of the category of commercial speech,"'2" there is also a
safeguard inherent in limiting the applicability of a commercial
speech definition to false advertising. Perhaps the most serious
pitfall in the commercial speech doctrine is the potential that
truthful, "pure" speech will be suppressed due to mis-
classification. 0  But in the event that some corporate
12 Cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (only a
plurality condemning state prohibition on price advertising for alcoholic beverages as a
"wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information.").
124 See supra note 23.
121 See supra Part IV.A. See also Norton, supra note 53, at 744 ("[C]ommercial
speech that undermines informed decisionmaking - because it is false, misleading, or
concerns illegal conduct - receives no First Amendment protection.").
126 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). See supra Part II.B.
127 See Post, supra note 16, at 7 ("We might seek to define the category by
reference to the constitutional values it is designed to serve.").
128 But see Linda Greenhouse, Free Speech for Companies on Justices'Agenda,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at A17 (quoting Professor Post as commenting on Nike v.
Kasky: "The structure of public discourse is at stake.").
121 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 254-55 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765
(1993); citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Rubin, Sec. of the
Treasury v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
120 See McGowan, supra note 74, at 404 ("[Tlhere is always a possibility that
the doctrine will be applied to deny first amendment protection to speech that is not
commercial at all."). A related pitfall that arises in hybrid speech cases is the
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communication is mis-categorized as commercial speech under
Kasky, permissible regulation is still limited to the
communication's capacity to deceive consumers. The entity
bringing the suit would have the burden of proving that the
statements were likely to deceive before the commercial
speaker would face any liability.'3 ' Moreover, because the relief
sought generally is equitable in nature, a judge and not a jury
would be deciding whether the commercial speech is likely to
deceive the public.
4. Other Limits
While some of the communications named in Kasky's
complaint could be argued to fit plausibly within more classic
notions of commercial speech,'32 the California Supreme Court's
definition of commercial speech is clearly applicable to forms of
communication beyond what the United States Supreme Court
has considered in commercial speech cases thus far. This in
itself is not shocking. After all, as the Kasky court recognized,
the format of particular communications before the United
States Supreme Court has not always been determinative of
whether they are commercial speech. For example, commercial
speech has been held to include the alcohol content on the label
of a beer bottle,' letterhead and business cards identifying an
attorney as a Certified Public Accountant or Certified Family
Planner,'" and trade names. ' The United States Supreme
Court also made it clear in Bolger that the presence of
particular speech characteristics like advertisement format,
economic motivation, and product reference may nevertheless
in some cases be insufficient to indicate that the speech is
commercial, and in other cases may not be necessary, either
possibility that "entirely truthful commercial speech [will] deprive otherwise fully
protected speech of first amendment protection." Id. at 395.
' See Stem, supra note 1, at 122; Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of
Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035,
1056-57 (1990).
... For example, some of Nike's communications were paid advertisements.
For a complete list of the communications Kasky named in the complaint, see supra
note 60.
. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 481.
134 Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Profl Reg'n., Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 142 (1994).
135 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1979) (elaborating on the capacity




individually or in combination, for a determination that the
speech is commercial.'36
The California Supreme Court, however, seemingly
went a step further than Bolger by eschewing format as a
relevant variable entirely. Instead, the Kasky test simply
requires that the seller's communication be intended to make a
sale and to reach a potential customer. '37
Given the impossibility of naming the myriad types of
communications that comprise modern commercial speech,"'
doing away with the format prong makes some sense. On the
other hand, the potential risk posed by dropping any format
requirement from a test for commercial speech is the fear of
overextending the Kasky test to corporate speech in
noncommercial settings. For instance, we do not want
corporations to be chilled from responding to the press or to law
enforcement officials in emergency situations. 3' In these kinds
of situations it is easy to imagine a corporate agent having to
make its best guess or otherwise make off-the-cuff statements
regarding the facts of its products, services, or business
operations. While, as we have seen, a corporate speaker is
likely to know, or be able to verify, the truth about such facts,
in the context of an emergency press conference the corporate
speaker is functioning as a public citizen and there should be
no legal disincentive for the corporation to disclose information
rapidly. Fortunately, there are significant limiting factors in
Kasky that should adequately prevent this undesirable result.
First, given that the sort of communications at issue
before the California Supreme Court were not off-the-cuff but
138 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 n.13 and n.14
(1983).
137 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256-58.
'38 See LOUISE M. PARENT ET AL., Advertising Review, Clearance and
Challenges, in SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL
§56:18 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2003) ("Marketers and the in-house lawyers who counsel
them know that there are many, many more ways of communicating with consumers
and influencing their purchasing decisions" than advertising in the traditional sense,
including but not limited to: "internet web sites," "direct mail," "press releases,"
"package labeling," "product names and trademarks," "slogans and taglines," and
"distribution of article reprints.").
139 Jeffrey L. Fisher, Nike v. Kasky: Will the Shield of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine Become a Sword?, 20-WTR COMM. LAW. 1, 30 (2003) ("When contacted by
reporters, corporate spokespersons would be liable for any factual inaccuracies that
they inadvertently include in their statements. Even when it would be possible for
businesses to take the time to verify factual uncertainties and to craft their own press
releases, they would still be liable for any part of their releases that a jury later
determines has the capacity to mislead the public.").
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were instead part of a "modern, sophisticated public relations
campaign,"4° the Kasky test implies that some degree of
forethought on the part of the speaker is required before the
speaker should be held accountable for commercial
misrepresentations. This is not too difficult a distinction to
make. For example, in the context of a terrorist threat, a
corporation may be called upon to disclose the locations of its
factories, or the identities or qualifications of its workers in a
particular factory. In this scenario, the corporation is
functioning more as a public citizen without the opportunity to
meticulously verify its facts. On the other hand, in non-
emergency situations where the corporation's lawyers or PR
consultants construct the text for its commercial website, or
agents of the corporation compose letters to universities where
the corporation has apparel contracts, the speech is
commercial.
The second limiting factor is the Kasky test's tandem
requirements of economic motivation and commercial audience,
which would exempt corporate speech in noncommercial
settings, for example at the emergency press conference just
described. It is also worth noting that there is a general
correlation between the materiality of a commercial speech
falsehood and the likelihood that the speaker knows the
statement is deceptive. With some exceptions, the more
material a deception is, the more likely that the commercial
speaker is actually aware of the deception.'4 ' Moreover, the less
materially misleading a seller's statement of fact about her
products, services, or business operations, the less likely
anyone would try to bring a false advertising lawsuit.'42
Practically speaking, therefore, the absence of a format prong
40 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 257.
.4 Claims come to the FTC or Lanham Act judges with a presumption of
materiality, but if it appears the claim is immaterial, if the advertiser presents
evidence to that effect, or if harm to the public cannot be proven, then the case will be
dismissed. See generally Preston, supra note 131, at 1056-57.
,42 For example, if a corporate agent responds at a press conference that 75%
of her corporation's products are made in the USA, and in actuality only 70% are, the
difference is unlikely to be material enough to produce a suit. Moreover, damages are
not available to those bringing actions under private attorney general statutes such as
the California statute authorizing Kasky's suit. To the extent that the California
statute allows an unharmed activist to bring a suit against a commercial speaker who
has allegedly falsely advertised, the problem may lie not with the Kasky commercial
test but with the California statute. Significantly mitigating any such problem,
however, is California's anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation),
which is an effective means of deterring litigation that is harassing and without merit.
See supra note 69.
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should not significantly chill corporate speakers because the
sort of false or misleading claims one would have to account for
in a court of law are also more likely to have been made by a
speaker who had actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the
deception.
V. RESPONDING TO KASKY'S CRITICS
A. The Importance of Clarifying the Matter Debated
Some critics of the commercial speech doctrine,
including Professor Ronald Collins, have argued that the kind
of statements at issue in the Nike case "should be treated on
par with political and/or artistic statements."'43 Presumably,
this is because the statements were made in response to public
criticism, rendering the commercial elements inextricably
intertwined with noncommercial elements. When it is not
possible for the speaker to utter the noncommercial component
without the commercial component, the speech is considered
"hybrid" speech and is entitled to full First Amendment
protection.' It is unfair to Nike and to the public, the
argument goes, if the corporation is not permitted to tell its
side of the story without being hobbled by the shackles of
commercial speech, even if its communications are properly
characterized as such.14" ' To evaluate this claim it is crucial to
recognize that there are actually two areas of public concern
relevant to Nike: the broad public debate about globalization,
and the narrower public charge that some of Nike's products
are being manufactured in factories with substandard
treatment of workers. Once it is accepted that a seller's
statements about business operations are within the subject
143 Ronald K.L. Collins, Let Nike Talk, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at 37.
'44 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
("Thus, where, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably
intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and
another test to another phrase."). For background on hybrid speech, see supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text.
14' For example, Eugene Volokh, a UCLA law professor who edits the
libertarian Web blog "The Volokh Conspiracy," argues that "[ilt seems wrong to let
Nike's critics play under one set of rules (because they're not commercial advertisers),
but force Nike to play under another." Eugene Volokh, Nike and the Free-Speech Knot,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at A16. See also Richard 0. Faulk, Commentary, A Chill
Wind Blows: California's Supreme Court Muzzles Corporate Speech, 16 No. 21
ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 11 (2002) (observing that as a result of Kasky, "critics
of corporate products or practices may speak more freely than their targets may speak
in defending themselves").
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matter of commercial speech,'4' the conclusion that factual
refutations to specific public concerns about those business
operations should not be fully protected speech is inevitable.
In the public debate about whether globalization is more
beneficial or more detrimental to the overall good, there is no
question that Nike can and should participate with the full
protection of the First Amendment. Indeed, corporations like
Nike offer a crucial perspective on issues such as the domestic
and foreign economic effects of using foreign labor, whether
domestic companies should be responsible at all for working
conditions in overseas factories, and what standards are
acceptable in those factories. For instance, the business
community has "emerged as a central voice in the domestic
debate about U.S. human rights policy toward China."47 The
Kasky court explicitly recognized the right of corporations to
participate in such policy debates."' Thus, the claim that the
California Supreme Court's opinion prevents Nike from telling
its side of the story in the debate about globalization is merely
a straw man argument.
For example, as an implied analogy to Kasky, Professor
Collins has us imagine that a bicycle-manufacturing company
makes statements in commercials "about the general
desirability of foreign-based manufacturing sites or about
environmentally desirable ways to manufacture steel and
rubber."49 Certainly most would agree with Collins that such
statements should not be "within the purview of government
regulation,'" ° including the California Supreme Court."' Of
course, even assuming Nike had made statements of this
variety, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
full First Amendment protection is only warranted when a "law
14 And, in fact, most of Kasky's critics do accept this premise. See, e.g.,
Volokh, supra note 145 (conceding that "[a] billboard saying, 'Buy Nike shoes: Made
with high-paid labor,'... would be commercial speech.").
147 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 82, at 95-96.
148 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261 ("[T]o the extent Nike's speech represents expression
of opinion or points of view on general policy questions such as the value of economic
"globalization," it is noncommercial speech subject to full First Amendment
protection.").
149 See Collins, supra note 143.
150 Id.
151 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260 ("To the extent Nike's press releases and letters
discuss policy questions such as the degree to which domestic companies should be
responsible for working conditions in factories located in other countries, or what
standards domestic companies ought to observe in such factories, or the merits and




of man or of nature makes it impossible" to utter the protected
statements in a noncommercial context."' For this reason,
reliance on Riley by one of the Kasky dissenters " in support of
the argument that Nike's speech was hybrid speech seems
misplaced. The Court in Fox went to the trouble of clarifying
that in Riley "the commercial speech (if it was that) was
'inextricably intertwined' because the state law required it to
be included."" As the California Supreme Court observed: "No
law required Nike to combine factual representations about its
own labor practices with expressions of opinion about economic
globalization, nor was it impossible for Nike to address those
subjects separately."15
In any event, closer examination reveals that Nike's
statements were not about globalization in general, but instead
were about the specific labor practices in Nike's overseas
factories. 5 If statements about the conditions under which
products are made are properly within the subject matter of
commercial speech, the fact that Nike was flatly contradicting
allegations about these conditions in its communications to
consumers should not transform the statements into speech
that is fully protected without regard to its falsity. " Were the
United States Supreme Court to allow as much, a seller would
have incentive to keep itself uninformed about the safety of its
products, the effectiveness of its services, or the standards of
its business operations. At least as long as the seller was not
intentionally lying, it could refute any damaging allegations,
claim to be engaging in debate on a matter of public concern,
and expect the protection of the First Amendment. Beyond
152 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
15 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 266 (Chin, J., dissenting).
154 Fox, 492 U.S. at 474. Moreover, at issue in Riley was the regulation of
charitable solicitations. Unlike the speech at issue in Kasky, charitable solicitations do
not involve factual representations about service or a product, for example statements
about the conditions under which products are made.
See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260-61.
' See Letter to Universities, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)
(explaining that "[aidvertisers should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading
product information from government regulation simply by including references to
public issues"); but see Fisher, supra note 139, at 31 (2003) ("[Wjhen the performance
qualities of a product or service become an issue of public concern, its purveyor ought to
be able to respond to media inquiries and issue press releases with the full protection
of the First Amendment.").
15 In fact, in some jurisdictions, if commercial speech were to be treated on a
par with political speech, even the intentional lie might be privileged by the First
Amendment. See, e.g., State ex rel. Public Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm.,
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the distortion this would inflict on the free market, the impact
on the public welfare would be immeasurable.
For example, when faced with allegations that its pain-
reliever containers have been tampered with, a seller or
manufacturer could claim that the containers are tamper-proof
with constitutional protection, hoping to maintain its sales
even where it should have known its refutation to be untrue.
Or, if university students were to protest Nike contracts
because the athletic shoes were made of leather, Nike's letter to
the athletic directors negligently could assert with First
Amendment immunity that the material was synthetic.
Commercial speech should not be transformed into fully
protected public debate just because the speaker refutes a
public allegation about its specific product, service, or business
operation.9 Moreover, because the facts of a corporation's own
business operations, products or services are easily verifiable
before the corporation speaks, it needs little breathing room for
error when it imparts this kind of information.6
In a hypothetical horrible Professor Eugene Volokh
parades as a possible consequence of Kasky, "[Plro-life activists
accuse an abortion clinic of using some supposedly heinous or
dangerous abortion procedure.".1 The doctors who co-own the
abortion clinic then respond, in op-eds, in interviews with
957 P.2d 691, 697-99 (Wash. 1998) (finding no compelling interest to sustain a
Washington state law prohibiting political advertisements containing false statements
of material fact made with actual malice).
159 Cf Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 163 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) ("[Tjhe right of government to restrain false
advertising can hardly depend upon the view of an agency or court as to the relative
importance of the issue to which the false advertising relates."). At issue in this case
were statements by a trade association denying there was scientific evidence that
eating eggs increased the risk of heart and circulatory disease. The court held that
these statements were commercial speech that could be regulated to the extent the
statements were false or misleading, even though the trade association made the
statements "to counteract what the FTC described as 'anti-cholesterol attacks on eggs
which had resulted in a steadily declining per capita egg consumption.'" While the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit was sound, its holding takes a crucial step beyond
Kasky, seemingly evaluating the speech at issue based on its potential to mislead
customers, which is probably over paternalistic. See Post, supra note 16, at 39 (The
state should not be invited "to mutilate the thinking process of the community.").
6 See supra Part IV.B.1. In general, statements of fact about business
operations are perhaps even more verifiable than statements of fact about products, as
many companies have far more products than factories. Nike may be an exception, with
900 factories in 50 countries and more than 660,000 workers. See NIKE INC., OUR
BUSINESS MODEL & ITS CHALLENGES, at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?
page=25&cat=businessmodel (last updated Jan. 2004).
161 Eugene Volokh, Business Speech in Public Debates, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, Jan. 10, 2003, available at http://volokh.com/2003_01_05_volokh-
archive.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
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newspapers, and in public debates, "[Nio, what we do is ethical
and humane.' 62 A jury finds that these statements were
misleading and the judge issues an injunction against further
such statements.1
Professor Volokh is among the many critics of the Kasky
decision who fail to differentiate between debate about
business policy and debate about the particular facts of a
business' operations. Significantly, in Professor Volokh's
example, the pro-life activists are accusing the clinic of using
specific procedures (the dangerous and heinous kind). In other
words, they are concerned with the facts of the clinic's business
operations. To the extent that the doctors do not engage their
critics in that debate, and instead comment on the ethics or
humaneness of abortions in general, or even whether a
particular type of abortion procedure is actually dangerous,
they would be outside the scope of commercial speech as
defined in Kasky. However, to the extent that the doctors deny
that they are using the procedures that they are being accused
of, they are indeed engaging in commercial speech and should
not be permitted to mislead the public.
Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of
America" (Bernardo), a recent California Appeals Court
decision applying Kasky, may allay Professor Volokh's fears. In
Bernardo, plaintiffs alleged that the Planned Parenthood
website contained misleading statements regarding the safety
of abortions and the debated link between breast cancer and
abortions, and sought injunctive relief under the same
California false advertising laws employed in Kasky."' For
example, Planned Parenthood claimed that the theory linking
abortion and breast cancer "has not been borne out by
research.""'
The court found that even if Planned Parenthood was a
commercial speaker, its statements were not within the range
of the Kasky test because they were clearly framed as
statements of opinion."' As the court noted, the plaintiff could
"' Id. Professor Volokh's example is transparently aimed at the political
leanings he must suspect are shared by those who support the Kasky test.
163 Id.
16 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (2004).
16 Id. at 203.
1 Id. at 205. Notably, Planned Parenthoods website also included "studies
that support Bernardo's position that such a link exists." Id.
167 Id. at 219-20.
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not claim that the alleged link between cancer and abortion
was "within Planned Parenthood's 'own knowledge.' ' 68 The link
was, rather, a matter of genuine scientific debate. There is an
unmistakable distinction between statements made in the
context of policy debates and statements about the factual
operations that will be within the corporation's own knowledge.
Thus, corporate speakers can and should participate in policy
debates to the same extent as their critics.
The situation is different where the corporation
addresses concerns about the facts of its business operations.
There, the corporation is speaking on matters within its own
knowledge and should not be permitted to deceive consumers
or potential consumers. This asymmetrical treatment of
allegations about a corporation's products, services, or business
operations, which may be inaccurate so long as they do not
defame the corporation or its products,"' and the commercial
speaker who refutes the allegations,17 is acceptable not because
commercial speech is less valuable, but because the linchpin for
its constitutional value - facilitation of autonomy and wise
public decisionmaking - is accurate information.
It also has been suggested that by refusing to afford full
First Amendment protection to corporate statements that are
in response to allegations regarding business operations,
"[r]eporters may ... shelve such stories for fear of publishing
something that is too one-sided."171 It is hard to assess the
validity of such predictions, made without any empirical
8s Id. at 219.
169 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 561 (1977) (a corporation for profit
may sue if "the matter tends to prejudice it in the conduct of its business or to deter
others from dealing with it"); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. at 761-62 (holding that corporations may sue for defamation to protect their
business reputations). Corporations that are characterized as public figures would have
to show that the speaker uttered a false statement with reckless disregard for the
truth. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261 (finding that Nike could recover damages upon proof
that statements by a noncommercial speaker were false and made with actual malice).
It is less clear what scienter is to be imposed on commercial speakers (in contrast to
noncommercial critics) who make statements about a competitor's products or services.
Compare Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 555-58 (5th Cir. 2001)
(concluding strict liability applies whether the commercial speech is about the
speaker's own goods or those of another) with WWFE v. Bozell, III, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the Fifth Circuit does not require actual malice but
observing the question is still open in the Second Circuit and that in any case actual
malice was sufficiently proven in the case before it to preclude summary judgment).
170 Faulk, supra note 145 ("A strict standard of 'absolute truthfulness' means
a besieged speaker with little time to investigate allegations responds at its own risk,"
while those making the allegations have more time to verify their statements.).
17' Fisher, supra note 139, at 30.
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evidence, but simple observations of media behavior undercut
this concern. A predictable rule of thumb is that the media's
decision to publish is predicated more on the newsworthiness of
a story than on the reporter's ability or interest in covering all
sides of a controversy.17 For example, in the 1990s many
hundreds of reporters apparently had no problem publishing
allegations and evidence of sweatshop conditions in overseas
corporate factories, with or without the corporations'
statements of fact about these conditions.
173
B. The Ineffectiveness of Counter-speech
It has been argued that media scrutiny and corporate
competition, or alternatively, government counter-speech will
adequately safeguard against commercial deception,
particularly when there is already public concern about a
corporation's products or business operations."' The prospect
that consumers will benefit from the 'clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error,'1 '  as was urged by a conglomeration of media
corporations opposed to Kasky,'17 is undeniably appealing. And
counter-speech is certainly less restrictive. Nevertheless, the
view that counter-information will serve to negate the
distorting effects of speech "is of questionable accuracy in the
arena of commercial speech."7
172 See, e.g., FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE: AMERICA
TRANSFORMS ITSELF, 1900-1950 234 (1952).
173 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Helen McGee Konrad, Eliminating Distinctions Between
Commercial and Political Speech: Replacing Regulation with Government
Counterspeech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (1990) (arguing for government
counterspeech over regulation); Scott Joachim, Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and
Mirrors: A Proposal for the Abandonment of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and an
Analysis of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
517, 548 (1997) (arguing corporate counter-speech is likely when one company has a
better product than its competitor); Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers,
Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade
Associations in Support of Petitioners, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
... New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Blackwell ed. 1947); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("[Flalsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education
and discussion .... ").
176 Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines,
Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations
in Support of Petitioners at 18, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
177 Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and the
Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2003) (surveying how
behavioral analysis might inform First Amendment jurisprudence).
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First of all, in commerce it is not always clear when
counter-speech is needed. Manufacturers may coordinate
efforts to mislead consumers.17 There are often disincentives for
sellers to counter the speech of their competitors. For example,
corporations frequently choose not to advertise that their
products are safer than the competitor's, for even if doing so
would improve a particular brand as against that competitor,
public concern about safety may reduce demand for the product
as a whole."9 Moreover, in some instances, consumers, the
media, and corporate watch-dog groups would have no way to
know whether a corporation believes itself to be speaking on a
matter of public concern (therefore privileged to make
deceptive statements about its business operations, products,
or services), and as a result would not know whether the
corporation's statements warranted scrutiny."
Secondly, even when it is clear to some entity that
counter-speech is needed to correct a commercial deception, it
is not always possible to produce effective counter-speech.
Without the interest of the media, concerned consumers are
hopelessly outmatched in a shouting match over the truth of a
giant corporation's business operations. For example, Nike's
daily budget for advertising is around 3 million dollars. 8' The
media by necessity and choice will not investigate or expose
every instance of false or misleading commercial speech, but
only those few that make good stories.'
178 Id. at 57. See, e.g., Does I v. Gap, Inc., 2002 WL 1000073, at *2 (D. N. Mar.
I. May 10, 2002) (certifying plaintiffs as a class against numerous garment
corporations because the "injuries, although different, all stem from the same alleged
conspiracy amongst the defendants to dominate and control the garment workforce of
the Commonwealth"). For more on this case, including the substantial settlements that
resulted, see Press Release, Sweatshop Watch, First-Ever Lawsuits Filed Charging
Sweatshop Conspiracy Between Major U.S. Clothing Designers, Retailers, Foreign
Textile Producers (Jan. 13, 1999) available at http://www.sweatshopwatch.orglswatchl
marianas/lawsuit.html.
179 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 56-57.
18 For example, the product label "Made by Native Americans," may or may
not touch on a matter of public concern, depending on many contextual factors like the
region where the product is sold.
181 See Press Release, ReclaimDemocracy.org, Kasky v. Nike Inc. Settled -
Participants Pleased, Many Activists Inflamed (Sept. 12, 2003), at
http://www.reclaimdemocracy.orgnikelnike-settleslawsuit.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2004).
182 See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 172, at 234.
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C. Will the Kasky Test Chill Political Speech?
Commenting on Kasky, Paul McMasters observed "that
if free-speech rights can be taken away from one type of
organization - a for-profit corporation - then, presumably, they
could be taken away from other types of organizations as well,
such as political parties, religious groups, or, conceivably
public-interest non-profits. "1" Granting this First Amendment
ombudsman some license for hyperbole - after all, the case had
not yet been settled and so perhaps scare tactics would find
purchase - this grave prediction flies in the face of First
Amendment history and theory. Perhaps most directly, if
somewhat simplistically, one might reply that no free speech
rights were taken away from Nike: The commercial speech
doctrine simply limits a corporation's leeway to deceive
consumers. The corporation still has rights under the First
Amendment to issue political speech, to lobby, or to produce
artistic expression. Moreover, its individual members have the
speech rights of every citizen. But the First Amendment has
never given a corporation the right to utter deceptive
commercial speech.
More generally, McMasters is overlooking the fact that
the constitutional purposes served by commercial speech differ
significantly from those served by political, religious, and non-
profit speech. While political, religious, or artistic speech are
protected by both the speaker's and the listener's First
Amendment interests, commercial speech is constitutionally
valuable only for the listener.'" As such, the right to utter even
deceptive political or religious speech could not be taken away,
except perhaps where the speaker has knowingly lied or has
spoken with reckless disregard for the truth."n
'8' Dan Kennedy, Silent Swoosh, THE PHOENIX.COM, May 2-8, 2003, at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/don't-quote-memulti-page/documents/
02860571.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003); see also McGowan, supra note 74, at 404
("The existing commercial speech cases ... will support almost any application of the
doctrine: all the Court needs to do is find a link between the speech and profit. This
practice perpetuates itself, and grows even broader through application, because each
peculiar application of the doctrine becomes precedent for future, even more peculiar
applications.").
18 See supra Part II.B.
'8 Jurisdictions are divided on whether a state can constitutionally prohibit
knowing falsehoods in areas of protected speech such as political speech, and the
United States Supreme Court has not addressed this question. Compare State ex rel.
Public Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998) (holding
a state law prohibiting political advertisements containing false statements of material
fact made with actual malice to be unconstitutional) with State v. Davis, 499 N.E.2d
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The person engaging in political or religious speech is
achieving a purpose that is guaranteed by the First
Amendment and is irrespective of whether anyone is even
there to hear the speech. While in rare instances there may be
a compelling enough interest to prohibit knowing falsehoods in
such speech (e.g., defamation of political rivals), the
constitutional value it has for the speaker ensures that she will
never be liable for any negligent misleading statements. The
determinative factor in the amount of constitutional protection
for speech is "the achievement of constitutional purposes." "
D. How Does the Kasky Test Affect Image Marketing?
The trend in marketing is leaning away from
informational advertising and towards marketing an image
that will emotionally affect the consumer.'87 Frequently,
advertisements "do[ not refer to any individual product or
service at all, but rather seek[] to project a favorable
impression of the sponsoring corporation."" This kind of image
marketing has led some to fear that "[ilf certain forms of
commercial expression such as that in Nike are not accorded
ample constitutional protection, the sphere of our political and
artistic expression will inevitably decrease."" This does not
seem too likely. As we have seen, the purview of Kasky is
explicitly limited to "factual representations" about the
speaker's own business operations, products, or services."
Bicycle commercials that present "poets reading their award-
winning poems, rock and rap musicians singing their popular
songs, and 9/11 heroes urging viewers to support American
charities" 9' do not contain statements of fact about business
operations, products, or services. Nor do ads that "depict
deliciously tempting cakes and cookies with a simple
statement: 'Got Milk?'"' Moreover, it is fairly difficult to
1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding a state law prohibiting false statements about
political candidates made with actual malice to be constitutional).
1 Post, supra note 16, at 18; see also Stern, supra note 1, at 148.
187 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 56.
'8 Stern, supra note 1, at 120.
1 Collins, supra note 143, at 36.
190 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
191 Cf Collins, supra note 143, at 37 (suggesting these hypothetical
commercials as examples of what would be at risk if the United States Supreme Court
upholds Kasky).
192 Cf Joachim, supra note 174, at 542-44 (suggesting this and other non-
quid-pro-quo advertisements are at risk from the commercial speech doctrine).
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suppose exactly what the claim of deception would be in image
advertisements such as the ones just quoted.'93 Even where
possible claims of deception are more conceivable, for example
that a tobacco corporation is misleading consumers when its
commercials portray sexy models smoking (i.e., "smoke and
you'll be sexy"), the corporation is clear of the Kasky test
because this is not a factual representation about its own
goods, services, or business operations. Whether smoking
cigarettes actually will make the individual consumer sexier is
by no means within the tobacco corporation's knowledge."
VI. CONCLUSION
Liberals don't much like commercial speech because it's commercial;
conservatives mistrust it because it's speech. 95
Deciding how much protection to accord commercial
speech will always be thorny. As the above quotation
memorably captures, commercial speech does not neatly fall
within our legal and political paradigms. Indeed, the free
market justification for according protection to commercial
speech is subverted both by not enough protection and by too
much protection: If facilitation of consumer choice is the goal,
there must be a balance between under-protection, which
would allow the government to regulate and suppress accurate
information, and over-protection, which would allow deception
by sellers. Those who are ideologically bent may feel conflicted
between corporate accountability and robust protection of
speech and debate, or between protecting states' rights and
promoting efficiency in the market."
'93 See also Stern, supra note 1, at 121 ("It is difficult to imagine a company's
being deterred from airing an advertisement conveying its warm and caring nature by
the prospect that an employee's alleged failure to live up to this portrayal will provoke
a successful action, public or private, for misrepresentation.").
"4 Cf Bernado v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 219-
20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a commercial speaker's statements of opinion on
matters not within its knowledge are not within the Kasky definition of commercial
speech).
. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 101, at 652.
"6 Chief Justice Rehnquist has had conspicuous difficulty staying consistent
on the degree of protection to be accorded commercial speech. As Earl Maltz puts it,
"the philosophy of deference reflected in Rehnquist's early commercial speech opinions
was plainly an important theme not only of his personal approach to constitutional
adjudication, but also of conservative constitutional jurisprudence generally from the
1960s through at least the end of the Burger era." Earl M. Maltz, The Strange Career of
Commercial Speech, 6 CHAP. L. REv. 161, 170 (2003). For example, in the 1970s then
Justice Rehnquist was writing dissents like this one:
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Part of the problem arises from subtle distinctions
between corporate business practices. For example, what
degree of outsourcing and subcontracting makes commercial
speech about business operations so unverifiable that the
corporation should not be liable? Similarly, the proliferation of
hybrid speech counsels against a heavy-handed approach to
regulation. Nevertheless, the vast majority of commentators
and perhaps all but one member of the current Court would at
least feel comfortable upholding regulations of deceptive
commercial speech. '97  Deceptive commercial speech is a
negative factor in the facilitation of public decisionmaking,
private autonomy, and an efficient free market. For this
reason, it remains important to accurately identify all
commercial speech and regulate against duplicity.
While it may be true that "[flew things are harder than
to observe clearly the life and institutions of one's own day,"'98
this is in fact the lot of legal scholars and courts. The California
Supreme Court appropriately recognized that contemporary
The Court speaks of the importance in a "predominantly free enterprise
economy" of intelligent and well-informed decisions as to allocation of
resources. While there is again much to be said for the Court's observation as
a matter of desirable public policy, there is certainly nothing in the United
States Constitution which requires the [government] to hew to the teachings
of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy
profession.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
783-84 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 591 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Beginning in the mid-90s, however, Rehnquist's position shifted
significantly. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and Rubin,
Sec. of the Treasury v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined a unanimous Court in finding restrictions on commercial speech to violate the
First Amendment. Finally, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the
Chief Justice cast a critical vote in support of the majority to strike down a prohibition
on cigarette advertising outdoors within 1000 feet of a school or playground. See
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 529-31.
197 See supra note 54. The holdout on the Court for completely abandoning the
separate category of commercial speech is Justice Thomas. See Lorillard Tobacco Co.,
533 U.S. at 578-79 (Thomas. J., concurring) ("[T]here is no reason to apply anything
other than our usual rule for evaluating solicitation and incitement simply because the
speech in question happens to be commercial."); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522
(Thomas. J., concurring) ("I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting
that 'commercial' speech is of a lower value than 'noncommercial' speech.").
198 ALLEN, supra note 172, at 234.
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marketing methods and consumer preferences demand a new
test to adequately categorize allegedly deceptive commercial
statements.
Jason A. Cade'
' A.B. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1997; J.D. candidate,
2005, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Professor Michael Madow for his valuable
guidance. For Dad.
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